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I. INTRODUCTION
Guy Charles has pointed out to me that The Cycles of Constitutional
Time [“Cycles”]1 does not say a lot about race. Although statements about
race, slavery, and Jim Crow appear at various points in the narrative,2 race is
not an organizing theme of the book. And yet race – and the use of race as a
political strategy – is behind many of my claims in Cycles. Charles’s
suggestion inspired me to write this Article, and to tell the story of the book
by making race the organizing principle.
The Cycles of Constitutional Time argues that we can understand
American constitutional development in terms of three kinds of cycles.3 The
first is the rise and fall of regimes featuring dominant political parties. The
second is a very long cycle of polarization and depolarization that stretches
from the Civil War through the present.4 The third cycle is a series of episodes
of constitutional rot and constitutional renewal.5
Each of these cycles has deep connections to successive political
struggles in the United States over race and racial equality. In each regime,
the dominant electoral coalition is shaped by the politics of slavery (in the
antebellum period) or race (after the Thirteenth Amendment).6 In several
cases, the dominant coalition breaks down because of disputes about slavery
or race. The cycle of polarization is highly correlated with attempts by
politicians to make race, and more generally, identity, the central questions
that divide the two major political parties. Finally, each period of
constitutional rot in the country’s history has been accompanied by deep
polarization that is connected both to increasing income inequality and to
party coalitions divided over issues of race.
I do not claim that race is either the sole or the dominant explanation for
the cycles of constitutional time in the United States. Nevertheless, as we
shall see, race is a powerful factor, and the politics of race are an important
driver of the cycles of regimes, polarization, and rot described in the book.
My purpose in this Article is to highlight the role that racial politics plays in
the transformations described in Cycles, and to show how questions of race
are important at each stage of the story.
1. JACK M. BALKIN, THE CYCLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL TIME (2020).
2. See id. at 13, 15, 18, 30, 45, 52, 62–63, 89–90, 116, 124, 135–37, 142, 161–
66, 168, 172–73.
3. Id. at 6.
4. Lee Drutman, American Politics Has Reached Peak Polarization, VOX (Mar.
24, 2016), https://www.vox.com/polyarchy/2016/3/24/11298808/ american- politicspeakpolarization [https://perma.cc/RDL4- XM9B]; Jeff Lewis, Polarization in
Congress, VOTEVIEW.COM (Mar. 11, 2018), https:// www.voteview.com/ articles/
party_polarization [https://perma.cc/5VZB- DUJA] (graph of “Liberal-conservative
partisan polarization by chamber”).
5. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 6.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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II. THE CYCLE OF REGIMES
Because of features of constitutional design, electoral rules, and the
development of the party system, American politics has a distinctive shape.7
It features political regimes, long periods of time in which one party tends to
dominate politics. The dominant party does not win all of the elections, but it
wins most of them and it sets the agenda for what people think is politically
possible at a particular period of time.8 There have been six of these regimes
in American history, each featuring a dominant party. In each cycle a new
dominant party rises, forms a winning coalition, dominates political agendas,
and then slowly decays and falls apart, often the victim of its own success:

Table 1: Regimes in American Political History, 1789-20209
(Years of White House control in parentheses)

Name

Years

Federalist

1789–1801

Jeffersonian

1801–1829

Jacksonian

1829–1861

Republican

1861–1933

New
Deal/Civil
Rights
Reagan
(Second
Republican)

1933–1981
1981–?

Dominant
Party
Federalists
(12)
DemocraticRepublicans
(28)
Democrats
(24)
Republicans
(52)
Democrats
(32)
Republicans
(24)

Opposition Parties
Jeffersonians (0)
Federalists (0)
National Republicans;
Whigs; Republicans
(8)
Democrats (20)10
Republicans (16)
Democrats (16)

7. Jack M. Balkin, Rot and Renewal: The 2020 Election in the Cycles of
Constitutional Time, 13 NORTHEASTERN U. L. REV. 617, 622–24 (2021).
8. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 13.
9. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 15. In Table 1, I begin each regime in the year a
new president takes office, while in the book I begin with the date of the preceding
election that shifts power.
10. I count Andrew Johnson as a Democratic president, even though he ran as
Lincoln’s running mate in 1864 as part of a national unity ticket.
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As we trace the rise and fall of these coalitions, we can see the role that
race plays in each of them.

A. Political Regimes in the Antebellum Era
The first transition between political regimes occurred in the election of
1800, when Thomas Jefferson’s Republicans defeated the Federalist Party of
John Adams and Alexander Hamilton. Jefferson (and Aaron Burr) won the
Electoral College by only eight votes over John Adams, seventy-three to
sixty-five.11 But Jefferson, his critics said, rode into the White House “on the
shoulders of slaves.”12
The source of this accusation is the 1787 Constitution’s three-fifths
clause.13 Counting slaves as three-fifths of a person increased the share of
congressional representation for the slave-holding states, an electoral
advantage that slowly decreased over time as the North and West become
more populous.14 Because each state received electoral votes equal to the sum
of its senators and representatives, the three-fifths clause gave slave-holding
states an advantage not only in Congress but also in electing the president
through the Electoral College system.15 Without this boost in political power,
Jefferson probably would have lost the 1800 election. Because the North and
West soon began to grow in population, the Jeffersonian takeover of
American politics might have been delayed by several election cycles – if it
ever occurred at all.
From the Founding to the Civil War, the three-fifths clause affected who
became president.16 It made a slaveholding state, Virginia, the most powerful
state in the Union, with the largest number of electoral votes until 1812, when
New York finally surpassed it.17 With the exception of one term by John
Adams, from 1789 to 1824 the Presidency was occupied by four Virginia
11.
See
1800
Presidential
Election,
270TOWIN,
https://www.270towin.com/1800_Election/index.html
[https://perma.cc/E2WZGVCW ] (last visited Feb. 11, 2021).
12. GARRY WILLS, NEGRO PRESIDENT: JEFFERSON AND THE SLAVE POWER 2
(2005) (quoting the Mercury and New-England Palladium of Boston, January 20,
1801). Sean Wilentz argues that this does not take into account “the Federalists’
deliberate suppression of the Jeffersonian vote in key Northern states.” SEAN
WILENTZ, THE POLITICIANS AND THE EGALITARIANS: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 105 (2016).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
14. MICHAEL F. CONLIN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
CIVIL WAR 90-91, 96 (2019).
15. Id.; MICHAEL TODD LANDIS, NORTHERN MEN WITH SOUTHERN LOYALTIES
THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND THE SECTIONAL CRISIS 5 (2014).
16. CONLIN, supra note 16, at 120–21.
17.
See
1812
Presidential
Election,
270TOWIN,
https://www.270towin.com/1812_Election/index.html
[https://perma.cc/4GLGJQFP] (last visited Feb. 11, 2021).
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slaveholders – George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, and
James Monroe.18 John Adams’s son, John Quincy, occupied the White House
for another interregnum of four years.19 After that, during the Jacksonian
regime that began following the 1828 election, the president was either a
Southerner or a Northern politician willing to accommodate the South.20
The three-fifths clause also gave the South extra leverage in legislation.
For example, until 1850, the South demanded and received parity in the
admission of new slaveholding and non-slaveholding states.21 This gave it
numerical equality in the Senate even as the population of non-slaveholding
states increased.
The three-fifths clause also helped ensure that the Supreme Court would
be friendly to the interests of slavery. As the country moved westward, the
number of judicial circuits expanded.22 This led Congress to increase the

18. Akhil Reed Amar, Actually, the Electoral College Was a Pro-Slavery Ploy,
N.Y. TIMES, April 6, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/06/opinion/electoralcollege-slavery.html [https://perma.cc/UX7D-96EY] (“Eight of the first nine
presidential elections were won by candidates who were plantation owners from
Virginia”); Elizabeth Nix, Which states have produced the most U.S. presidents?,
HISTORY (Sep. 10, 2014), https://www.history.com/news/which-u-s-states-haveproduced-the-most-presidents [https://perma.cc/57WG-65ZS]; Evan Andrews, How
Many U.S. Presidents Owned Enslaved People?, HISTORY (July 19, 2017),
https://www.history.com/news/how-many-u-s-presidents-owned-slaves
[https://perma.cc/D2K3-PLLP]; THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, Chronological List of
Presidents, First Ladies, and Vice Presidents of the United States,
https://www.loc.gov/rr/print/list/057_chron.html
[https://perma.cc/L3JZ-PWRU]
(last visited Feb. 5, 2021).
19.
THE
WHITE
HOUSE,
John
Quincy
Adams,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/presidents/john-quincy-adams/
[https://perma.cc/5KL5-VMPM] (last visited Feb. 11, 2021).
20. Amar, supra, note 18 (“every president until Abraham Lincoln was either a
Southerner or a Northerner who was willing (while president) to accommodate the
slaveholding South”); see also PAUL FINKELMAN, MILLARD FILLMORE 51, 84 (2011)
(noting Fillmore’s support for the Compromise of 1850).
21. CONLIN, supra note 16, at 105–109.
22. JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE JUDICIARY LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS
OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 124, 127, 139 (2012); Charles G. Geyh, Judicial
Independence, Judicial Accountability, And The Role Of Constitutional Norms In
Congressional Regulation Of The Courts, 78 IND. L.J. 153, 171 (2003) (“As new states
entered the Union, new judicial districts were created to service the new states, new
district judges were added to staff the new judicial districts, new circuits were added
to include the new states, and new Supreme Court Justices were added to oversee the
new circuits.”).
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number of Supreme Court Justices.23 Each Justice of the Supreme Court was
supposed to ride circuit – travel around and hear federal cases in the group of
states assigned to them.24 By convention, each Justice was supposed to be an
inhabitant of one of the states in the circuit assigned to them.25 Jacksonian
Democrats made sure that a majority of the circuits were composed of
slaveholding states.26 This, in turn, helped ensure that a majority of Justices
were from slaveholding states, or were otherwise sympathetic to the interests
of slavery.27
The cumulative advantages created by the three-fifths clause allowed
Jefferson’s Republicans, and later Andrew Jackson’s Democrats, to dominate
American politics until the Civil War.28 Because it shaped the nature of
representation, the three-fifths clause also shaped the distinctive ideology and
interests of the Jeffersonian regime and later, the Jacksonian regime. The
representational boost to slaveholders meant that the dominant party from
1800 to the Civil War would seek not only to protect slavery, but also to
extend its spread throughout the new territories that the United States acquired
through purchase and conquest.
During the Jacksonian regime that succeeded the Jeffersonian regime,
the dominant party was the country’s first mass political party: the “party of
democracy,” or the Democratic Party.29 The Jacksonian coalition championed
the expansion of suffrage to white working men and the rights of ordinary

23. Id.
24. Id. at 168.
25. See MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL
EVIL 149 (2006)(“The presidential practice of appointing one Supreme Court justice
from each circuit guaranteed a Southern majority on that tribunal.”).
26. Mark Graber, “No Better Than They Deserve:” Dred Scott And
Constitutional Democracy” 34 NO. KENTUCKY L. REV. 589, 604 (2007) (“Federal law
... structured the federal judicial system in ways that guaranteed that a majority of the
justices on the Supreme Court would be citizens from slave states.”).
27. Id. at 609–610 (“The Court that decided Dred Scott had a southern majority
because Jacksonians in the executive and legislative branches of the government
passed legislation placing five of the nine federal circuit court districts entirely within
the slave states, and presidents who depended on southern votes ensured that one
representative from each federal circuit district sat on the Supreme Court.”); Howard
Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas:
Federal Courts in the United States, 1875-1891, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 511, 514
(2002) (“[T]o ensure the protection of Southern regional interests . . . the slave states
were divided into five circuits, meaning that they would enjoy a majority on the
Supreme Court.”)
28. See LANDIS, supra note 17, at 5 (2014) (“the combination of the Three-Fifths
Clause and the subservience of Northern Democrats gave the South almost
unchallenged domination over the federal government in the antebellum era.”)
29.
Democratic
Party,
HISTORY,
(Apr.
4,
2018),
https://www.history.com/topics/us-politics/democratic-party#section_2
[https://perma.cc/4JDP-EJZE].
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working men against financial elites.30 But the Jacksonian coalition was
hardly egalitarian. It depended on the exclusion of women, Native
Americans, and Blacks from governance.31
The Jacksonian regime and its governing coalition were made possible
and kept in place by a racially exclusionary politics.32 That politics, in turn,
made the Jacksonian coalition increasingly captive to the interests of slavery
– which opponents called the Slave Power.33 As I discuss later on,34 the first
key episode of constitutional rot, in the 1850s, is due to the fact that the
defense and expansion of slavery had become a dominant force in American
politics.

B. The Republican Regime
The Republican Party, which began in 1854, sought to combat the rot
caused by the dominance of the Slave Power in American politics.35 Thus,
race played an important role in the rise of the next political regime, the long
Republican regime in which the GOP was the dominant political party from
1860 to 1932.36 That regime and its governing coalition emerged out of the
struggle over the expansion of slavery in the federal territories.
In its early years, and especially after the ratification of the Fifteenth
Amendment in 1870, it seemed as if a central goal of the regime would be to
30. See SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY: FROM LINCOLN
513 (2005) (“At bottom, the Jackson Democracy was chiefly what its
proponents said it was – a political movement for, and largely supported by, those who
considered themselves producers pitted against a nonproducer elite.”).
31. GERALD LEONARD AND SAUL CORNELL, THE PARTISAN REPUBLIC:
DEMOCRACY, EXCLUSION, AND THE FALL OF THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, 1780S–
1830S 147, 175–77, 207–209, 220 (2019).
32. Id.; see also DANIEL WALKER HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1815–1848 280 (2007) (“In the South, Jackson's
popularity was enhanced by the feeling that only he could be relied upon to maintain
white supremacy and expand the white empire, to evict the Indian tribes, to support
and extend slavery.”).
33. WILLS, supra note 14, at 11 (explaining that the Slave Power was facilitated
by the three fifths clause and other pro-slavery parts of the Constitution).
34. See infra Part IV-B.
35. HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, TO MAKE MEN FREE: A HISTORY OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY 6–7 (2014); WILLIAM E. GIENAPP, THE ORIGINS OF THE
REPUBLICAN PARTY, 1852-1856 357–365 (1987); Matthew Karp, The People’s
Revolution of 1856: Antislavery Populism, National Politics, and the Emergence of
the Republican Party, 9 THE JOURNAL OF THE CIVIL WAR ERA 524–545 (2019).
36. See supra Table 1; BALKIN, supra note 1, at 14.
TO JEFFERSON
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protect and defend the rights of the freedmen, and that this regime would be
backed by a multi-racial coalition of whites and Blacks.37 But as the years
wore on, the Republican regime became less concerned about racial equality
and more concerned about the defense of business interests.
Black voting rights became important to the Republican coalition as a
result of the Reconstruction Amendments.38 In 1866, when Congress debated
the Fourteenth Amendment, Black suffrage was a radical idea.39 Instead of
guaranteeing African Americans the right to vote, Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment fashioned a compromise: states that denied Black men the right
to vote would lose a proportionate share of representatives in the House.40
That provision, it turns out, was never enforced.41
In the meantime, however, Congress took control of Reconstruction
from President Andrew Johnson and refused to allow the former Confederate
states to reenter the Union until these states adopted new state constitutions
and elected new state governments that ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.42
Congress further required the former Confederate states to allow both Blacks
and whites to vote for delegates to these new state constitutional
conventions.43 The predictable result was that the newly organized southern

37. U.S. CONST. amend. XV; THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 15th Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution: Primary Documents in American History,
https://guides.loc.gov/15th-amendment [https://perma.cc/X5FA-3H23] (last visited
Feb. 14, 2021).
38. Jordan Grant, In 1868, Black suffrage was on the ballot, NATIONAL MUSEUM
OF
AMERICAN
HISTORY,
February
27,
2020,
https://americanhistory.si.edu/blog/black-male-suffrage
[https://perma.cc/MA2TVXKK]; Robert C. Kennedy, On This Day: On February 24, 1866, Harper's Weekly
featured a cartoon about voting rights for African Americans., N.Y. TIMES, (2001),
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/harp/022
4.html [https://perma.cc/LXT7-2A6Q].
39. Grant, supra note 38; A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S.
Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774-1875, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS,
http://memory.loc.gov/cgibin/ampage?collId=llcg&fileName=072/llcg072.db&recNum=611
[https://perma.cc/8VTK-BQTN] (last visited Feb. 14, 2021).
40. U.S. CONST. AMENDMENT XIV, § 2.
41. See Earl M. Maltz, The Forgotten Provision of the Fourteenth Amendment:
Section 2 and the Evolution of American Democracy, 76 LA. L. REV. 149, 178 (2015);
George David Zuckerman, A Consideration of the History and Present Status of
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 FORDHAM L. REV. 93 108–116, 124
(1961).
42. Grant, supra note 38; THE WHITE HOUSE, Andrew Johnson, The 17th
President of the United States, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-whitehouse/presidents/andrew-johnson/ [https://perma.cc/K2L4-SZQY] (last visited Feb.
14, 2021).
43. See PAUL BREST, SANFORD LEVINSON, JACK M. BALKIN, AKHIL REED AMAR,
AND REVA B. SIEGEL, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 356–67 (7th
ed. 2018); 14 U.S. STAT. 428, 429 (1867); Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon
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states guaranteed Black suffrage, and because Blacks were a large proportion
of the population, they became a powerful force in Southern politics.
As a result, many Republicans changed their minds about Black
suffrage, realizing that it would guarantee Republican political
competitiveness – if not political control – in the South. By 1868, when the
states ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, Black suffrage in the South had
fundamentally changed the political calculus.44 Republican politicians
quickly sent a Fifteenth Amendment, guaranteeing Black suffrage, to the
states, and it was ratified in 1870.45
If one had stopped the historical narrative at that point, one might have
predicted that the dominant coalition in the new Republican regime would be
a multi-racial coalition in which both whites and Blacks would participate in
governance, especially at the state level. But it soon became clear that this
strategy for maintaining political dominance would not succeed. It did not
succeed because of enormous resistance – and political terrorism – by white
Southerners.46 The “massive resistance” following Brown v. Board of
Education47 was nothing compared to white Southern resistance to equal
citizenship for Blacks in the former Confederacy. Only resolute military
control could suppress this resistance and protect Black civil rights. But
Northern will to maintain this control – which was both expensive and
unpopular – gradually gave way, partly as a result of the Panic of 1873.48
Over the course of the late nineteenth century, Republicans slowly
stopped pressing for Black civil rights.49 Democrats regained the House of
Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 92 GEO. L. J. 259, 270–71, 271 n.67 (2004).
44. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 46, at 259; ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO
VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 89-94
(2000); Grant, supra note 38.
45. THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 15th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, supra
note 37.
46. DAVID W. SOUTHERN, THE PROGRESSIVE ERA AND RACE: REACTION AND
REFORM, 1900-1917 1, 17–18 (2005); STEVEN HAHN, A NATION UNDER OUR FEET:
BLACK POLITICAL STRUGGLES FROM SLAVERY TO THE GREAT MIGRATION 272–73,
287–89, 310–312 (2003).
47. Brown v. Board of Ed. of Topeka, Kan., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see generally
NUMAN V. BARLETY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND POLITICS IN THE
SOUTH DURING THE 1950’S (1997).
48. SOUTHERN, supra note 48, at 19.
49. C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE COMPROMISE OF 1877
AND THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION 22–50 (1966) (arguing that Republicans reoriented
their party toward business interests, making Black civil rights a lower priority).
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Representatives in the 1874 elections, and the two parties remained highly
competitive throughout the Gilded Age.50 Democrats regrouped in the South,
and so-called Redeemer governments reestablished white hegemony.51
Although Blacks could still vote in the South during this period, they
gradually lost political control. Republicans, meanwhile, turned their
attention to economic nationalism and the protection of railroads and business
interests. To be sure, Republicans continued to “wave the bloody shirt,”
blaming the Democrats for the Civil War, but their devotion to Black civil
rights increasingly took a back seat to other issues.52
One key turning point came during Benjamin Harrison’s administration,
when Republicans had control of the White House and both Houses of
Congress for the first time since the end of Reconstruction.53 This proved to
be their last chance to push through civil rights legislation protecting Black
voting rights. Harrison, a former Union general who supported Black civil
and political rights, pushed for passage of the Lodge Bill, an early precursor
of the Voting Rights Act.54 But enough Northern and Western Republicans
failed to support it, and it died.55
By this point, Republicans had effectively given up on protecting Black
voting rights to bolster their political coalition. Instead, they focused on a
different strategy for maintaining political control. They admitted new
sparsely populated states to the Union, with the hope that these new states
would usually vote Republican, giving them an advantage in the Senate.56
By the end of the Gilded Age, Republican politicians had moved on to
new sets of issues. Although they were still the Party of Lincoln, they had
mostly lost interest in protecting the rights of Blacks. A Supreme Court
controlled by Republican appointees gave its blessing to Jim Crow in 1896 in
Plessy v. Ferguson.57 Democratic-controlled Southern states began to strip
Blacks of their voting rights through new state constitutions and
50. ROBERT W. CHERNY, AMERICAN POLITICS IN THE GILDED AGE 1868-1900
47–48, 141–43 (1997).
51. SOUTHERN, supra note 48, at 21–24.
52. WOODWARD, supra note 51, at 22–50; CHERNY, supra note 52, at 33–34.
53. Vincent P. De Santis, Benjamin Harrison and the Republican Party in the
South, 1889-1893, 51 INDIANA MAGAZINE OF HISTORY 4, 279 (1955).
54. Allan B. Spetter, Benjamin Harrison: Life Before the Presidency, UVA
MILLER
CENTER,
https://millercenter.org/president/bharrison/life-before-thepresidency [https://perma.cc/9P8S-K25F].
55. SOUTHERN, supra note 48, at 34.
56. Mark A. Graber, Constructing Constitutional Politics: The Reconstruction
Strategy
For
Protecting
Rights
99-100,
104-05,
https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2394&conte
xt=fac_pubs [https://perma.cc/6XWW-EBNJ]; Heather Cox Richardson, When
Adding New States Helped the Republicans, THE ATLANTIC, (September 19, 2019),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/09/when-adding-new-states-helpedrepublicans/598243/ [https://perma.cc/4UC5-26B9].
57. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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disenfranchisement schemes aimed both at Blacks and impoverished whites.58
In 1903, in Giles v. Harris,59 the Supreme Court announced that it would not
and could not do anything to stop determined attempts at the
disenfranchisement of Black voters in Southern states.60
Instead, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence developed a different focus:
the protection of capital. In 1888, the Court declared that corporations were
persons under the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment,61 giving railroads
and other businesses new constitutional means to resist economic regulation.
In 1895, the Court struck down the federal income tax in Pollock v. Farmer’s
Trust and Loan Co.62 And in 1897, in Allgeyer v. Louisiana,63 the Court
recognized freedom of contract as a specially protected constitutional liberty,
inaugurating the Lochner era. In this way, the Fourteenth Amendment,
originally designed to protect the rights of Black citizens, became a vehicle
for protecting the rights of businesses. These decisions reflected the evolution
of the Republican regime during the Gilded Age. The Republican Party
transformed from a multi-racial coalition devoted to equal rights for all
citizens into a coalition primarily concerned with the protection of business
interests, including the interests of railroads and other corporations.
Meanwhile, the opposition party, the Democrats, remained the party of the
South, and actively fought against the protection and expansion of Black civil
and political rights.

58. Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST.
COMM. 295, 301–304 (2000); J. MORGAN KOUSSER, THE SHAPING OF SOUTHERN
POLITICS: SUFFRAGE, RESTRICTION, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ONE-PARTY
SOUTH, 1880-1910 238-65 (1974); SOUTHERN, supra note 48, at 24–26.
59. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
60. Id. at 488 ("relief from a great political wrong, if done, as alleged, by the
people of a state and the state itself, must be given by them or by the legislative and
political department of the government of the United States.")
61. Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181,
188-89 (1888); see also Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company,
118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886)(reporter’s note of statement by Chief Justice Waite that all
of the Justices believed that corporations were persons under the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
62. Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429, modified on
reh’g, 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895) (striking down the 1894 Federal Income Tax).
63. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) (recognizing constitutional
liberty of freedom of contract).
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C. The New Deal/Civil Rights Regime
Until the 1896 election, issues of religion, race, and the memory of the
Civil War were key points of contention between the two major political
parties.64 After 1896, politics began to focus on different issues, and political
polarization began to recede.65
For many years, the Democratic Party seemed to have little to offer
African Americans. That began to change with the New Deal.66 The Great
Migration brought Black people from Southern states where they could not
vote to Northern states where they could.67 Republican abandonment of Black
civil rights created an opening for Northern Democrats to compete for Black
votes. If both parties were racist, Black Americans could decide which party
offered the greatest chances for economic improvement. Despite the racism
of Southern Democrats, Black voters recognized that the Democratic coalition
promised greater economic benefits and began to vote accordingly.68 By the
1936 election, approximately seventy percent of African Americans voted for
Franklin Roosevelt.69
The New Deal coalition made many different kinds of economic reforms
possible, and it brought large numbers of Black voters into the Democratic
Party. Political depolarization allowed cross-party alliances on different
issues. But the success of the New Deal coalition always rested on a Faustian
bargain concerning race.70 That coalition held together because of a racial
compromise between Northern liberal Democrats and Southern Democrats,
mostly at the expense of African Americans.71 Northern and Southern
Democrats often agreed on many questions of economic regulation. But they
disagreed strongly on questions of race.
To extent that the New Deal coalition held, Southern conservatives and
Northern liberals could inhabit the same party, and the Democrats could
64. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 166.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Isabel Wilkerson, The Long-Lasting Legacy of the Great Migration,
SMITHSONIAN
MAGAZINE
(Sept.
2016),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/long-lasting-legacy-great-migration180960118/ [https://perma.cc/YM4P-3LGB].
68. See NANCY JOAN WEISS, FAREWELL TO THE PARTY OF LINCOLN: BLACK
POLITICS IN THE AGE OF F.D.R xiv (1983) (arguing that despite Roosevelt’s lack of
interest in promoting civil rights, African Americans began to vote Democratic
because of the substantive economic benefits promised by the New Deal).
69. Brooks Jackson, Blacks and the Democratic Party, FACTCHECK.ORG, (April
18, 2008), https://www.factcheck.org/2008/04/blacks-and-the-democratic-party/
[https://perma.cc/YXX2-3N6Z].
70. IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR
TIME 17–18 (2013).
71. IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UNTOLD
HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (2005).
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remain the dominant political force, with each side of the coalition working
across the aisle with Republicans on particular issues. But the coalition began
to fray almost as soon as it was established. Roosevelt tried unsuccessfully to
purge conservative Southern Democrats in the 1938 election, and Southern
conservatives, in turn, objected to demands from liberals in the party.72
Harry Truman was far more overt in his support for Black civil rights
than Roosevelt ever dared.73 He desegregated the armed forces in 1947 and
ran on a civil rights plank in the 1948 election.74 In response, Southern
Democrats bolted from the party, and Senator Strom Thurmond ran for
president as a Dixiecrat.75 Meanwhile, Dwight D. Eisenhower’s two
successful presidential runs in 1952 and 1956 began to attract more
Southerners to the Republican Party.76 These tendencies would accelerate in
1964, when Barry Goldwater, an opponent of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
gained the Republican nomination.77 Lyndon Johnson won a landslide victory
that year, but Goldwater carried five states in the Deep South, long a
Democratic stronghold.78 That result was a harbinger of things to come.
Differences over race eventually doomed the New Deal coalition,
although the crackup would take many decades. The civil rights era was a
turning point. The social unrest of the 1960s and mobilizations for Black civil
rights and women’s liberation put continuous stress on the Democrats’
coalition.79 The Voting Rights Act of 1965 transformed American politics.80
The South became increasingly competitive for both parties, and because of
Republican political strategies on race, eventually a Republican bastion.

72. SUSAN DUNN, ROOSEVELT’S PURGE: HOW FDR FOUGHT TO CHANGE THE
DEMOCRATIC PARTY 7 (2010).
73. MICHAEL R. GARDNER, HARRY TRUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS 109 (2002).
74. Id. at 96, 111–13.
75. Id. at 101–02.
76. See Chester J. Pach, Jr., Dwight D. Eisenhower: Campaigns and Elections,
UVA MILLER CENTER, https://millercenter.org/president/eisenhower/campaigns-andelections [https://perma.cc/CJY3-EYAS].
77. Suzanne McGee, How Barry Goldwater Brought the Far Right to Center
Stage in the 1964 Presidential Race, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/news/barrygoldwater-1964-campaign-right-wing-republican
[https://perma.cc/839P-BQBH]
(last visited Feb. 14, 2021).
78. Id.
79. Democratic Party, supra note 31.
80. Voting Rights Act of 1965, HISTORY, (Nov. 9, 2009),
https://www.history.com/topics/black-history/voting-rights-act
[https://perma.cc/MK65-T4D7] (last visited Feb. 14, 2021).
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By the 1970s, the country had entered what we now call the culture
wars.81 Opposition to desegregation, court-ordered busing and affirmative
action became key issues in American politics.82 A racist demagogue,
Alabama Governor George Wallace, managed to attract a large number of
Democratic voters in the 1968 presidential election.83
Goldwater’s 1964 campaign showed that if race became the central issue
of national politics, the South would abandon the Democrats.84 Wallace
showed that a reactionary combination of populism and racism was attractive
to many voters in the New Deal coalition. After Wallace, Republican
politicians and the conservative activists who formed the New Right learned
how to use wedge issues of culture and race to successfully break apart the
New Deal Democratic coalition.85 They succeeded in forming a new
conservative coalition that included many white ethnics, Catholics, and
evangelical Christians.86 This eventually became the Reagan coalition that
won the White House for three consecutive terms in 1980, 1984, and 1988.87

D. The Reagan Regime and the Culture Wars
The Reagan Regime marked the triumph of the conservative movement
in American politics. Building on the political lessons of the 1960s and 1970s,
Republican politicians and conservative political entrepreneurs discovered
that the key to becoming the nation’s dominant party was to fight the culture
wars and make issues of race, religion, morality, and culture the central
81. ANDREW HARTMAN, A WAR FOR THE SOUL OF AMERICA: A HISTORY OF THE
CULTURE WARS 2 (2015)(describing the birth of the culture wars out of the tumult of
the 1960s).
82. Id. at 63, 105.
83. The standard account of Wallace’s political career is DAN T. CARTER, THE
POLITICS OF RAGE: GEORGE WALLACE, THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW CONSERVATISM, AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1995).
84. Ron Elving, Dixie's Long Journey From Democratic Stronghold To
Republican
Redoubt,
NPR
(Jan.
25,
2015,
7:03
AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/itsallpolitics/2015/06/25/417154906/dixies-longjourney-from-democratic-stronghold-to-republican-redoubt [https://perma.cc/36HDYX8W].
85. See Aram Goudsouzian, Why the Republican Party is so polarizing, WASH.
POST,
(Nov.
6,
2018
5:00
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2018/11/06/why-republican-party-is-sopolarizing/ [https://perma.cc/V5HN-CGU2] (arguing that the Republican Party's
strategy of polarization began with George Wallace's 1968 campaign and the
emergence of the New Right).
86. A. James Reichley, The Reagan Coalition, 1 BROOKINGS REV. 6, 6 (1982).
87. Thomas B. Edsall & Richard Morin, Reagan’s 1984 Voter Coalition is
Weakened
in
Bush
Victory,
WASH.
POST
(Nov.
9,
1988),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1988/11/09/reagans-1984-votercoalition-is-weakened-in-bush-victory/48de1848-eeb3-43f7-be89-d8dab70a4480/
[https://perma.cc/S6SY-NW22].
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questions of American politics.88 The left wing of the Democratic Party had
become very liberal on both cultural and economic issues in the late 1960s
and early 1970s. The sexual revolution, student protests against the Vietnam
War, and opposition to desegregation, busing, and affirmative action roiled
the country.89 This unrest and uncertainty gave Republicans an opportunity to
remake politics along conservative lines.
The very idea of a “culture war” suggests a conscious decision to
develop new issues and reframe existing social controversies in ways that
make the central battles of politics about race, religion, identity, and culture
rather than about economics and class. Even if Republicans lost many
individual battles – for example, on issues of sex equality or sexual morality
– fighting the culture wars was good politics because it was in their interest to
split the Democratic coalition apart, while it was in the interest of Democratic
politicians to keep the old New Deal coalition together for as long as possible.
For many years, Republican success in prosecuting culture war issues posed
a seemingly intractable problem for Democrats: how to simultaneously appeal
to voters who were liberal on issues of race, religion, and culture while
retaining the loyalty of more conservative white working-class voters,
especially in the Midwest and South.
Race, of course, was not the only issue in the culture wars. Conservative
politicians successfully combined their opposition to desegregation and
affirmative action with a focus on crime, social disorder, appeals to patriotism,
and cultural issues like the decline of the nuclear family, pornography, drugs,
abortion, and homosexuality.90 Nevertheless, racial issues and appeals to
racial resentment were always an important element in the culture wars.91
These issues and appeals allowed conservative Republicans to attack social
welfare and re-distributional programs by successfully associating them with
racial minorities in the minds of voters and by arguing that these programs
undermined individual responsibility and personal morality.92 In addition, by
emphasizing the country’s social disorder, demanding strict criminal
88. See E.J. DIONNE, WHY AMERICANS HATE POLITICS: DEATH OF THE
DEMOCRATIC PROCESS 12 (1991) (arguing that cultural issues allowed Republicans to
split the New Deal coalition).
89. See HARTMAN, supra note 81, at 25-26, 35, 63, 105; The 1970s, HISTORY,
https://www.history.com/topics/1970s/1970s-1 [https://perma.cc/4E83-HZ9W] (last
visited Feb. 14, 2021).
90. See DIONNE, supra note 90, at 79.
91. STUART STEVENS, IT WAS ALL A LIE: HOW THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BECAME
DONALD TRUMP 7–36 (2020) (describing Republican strategists’ and politicians’ use
of race).
92. Id.
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penalties, and criticizing constitutional restraints on law enforcement,
Republicans played on stereotypes about Black criminality.93
Ronald Reagan’s famous attacks on “welfare queens” who cheated the
government and “strapping young buck[s]” who spent their food stamps on
expensive steaks exemplified conservative racial framings.94 Conservative
politicians and their allies in conservative media realized that many issues that
might seem unrelated to race could nevertheless be racialized and connected
to stereotypes about African Americans.95 In this way, conservatives
succeeded in turning economic and class issues that had united the New Deal
coalition into cultural issues that divided it.
Conservative Christians were an important part of the Reagan coalition.
But even here, race helped attract religious conservatives to the Republican
cause.96 For example, the Reverend Jerry Falwell, who founded the Moral
Majority, was first drawn to the New Right not because of opposition to
abortion but because the federal government refused to allow tax exemptions
for private “segregation academies” that discriminated on the basis of race.97
Falwell’s decision to focus on abortion came in the late 1970s, well after Roe
v. Wade was decided.98
The reductio ad absurdum of the strategy of using racial resentments to
maintain the Republican coalition was the 2016 election of Donald Trump, an
unvarnished racist demagogue. Racial resentment was an important factor in

93. Id.
94. See IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, DOG WHISTLE POLITICS: HOW CODED RACIAL
APPEALS HAVE REINVENTED RACISM AND WRECKED THE MIDDLE CLASS 4, 58–59
(2015).
95. Id.; STEVENS, supra note 93.
96. Randall Balmer, The Real Origins of the Religious Right, Politico, (May 27,
2014),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/05/religious-right-realorigins-107133 [https://perma.cc/ZD8S-WT59].
97. Id.; KATHLEEN M. SANDS, AMERICA'S RELIGIOUS WARS THE EMBATTLED
HEART OF OUR PUBLIC LIFE 209 (2019).
98. Balmer, supra note 98 (“[I]t wasn’t until 1979 – a full six years after Roe –
that evangelical leaders, at the behest of conservative activist Paul Weyrich, seized on
abortion . . . [because] the anti-abortion crusade was more palatable than the religious
right’s real motive: protecting segregated schools.”).
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Trump’s victory,99 and Trump found multiple ways to invoke race and racial
stereotypes both during the 2016 campaign and throughout his presidency.100
Republican political strategies on culture and race made Republicans
increasingly a white person’s party. Moreover, the party slowly traded off
college-educated professionals and suburbanites – who became independents
or Democrats – for white working-class voters, especially in the South and
rural areas of the nation.101 The culture wars helped the party gain and keep
political power for decades, but it created a serious long-term problem. First,
Republicans became less attractive to younger and college-educated voters.102
Second, as the country has become more racially diverse, the percentage of
white voters has decreased with each election cycle.103 This created
increasingly difficult choices about how to keep the party dominant
politically. Republican politicians might back away from strategies of racial
resentment in order to attract Black, Asian, and Latino voters who might be
attracted by the party’s cultural and religious conservatism and its promises
of economic opportunity. Or Republican candidates might push even harder

99. Alan Abramowitz & Jennifer Mccoy, United States: Racial Resentment,
Negative Partisanship, and Polarization in Trump’s America, ANNALS, 681 ANNALS
OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. AND SOC. SCI. 137, 140–46 (2019),
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0002716218811309
[https://perma.cc/7AUE-LX4P]; Matthew Fowler, Why 41 percent of white
millennials
voted
for
Trump,
WASH. POST,
(Dec.
15,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/12/15/racialresentment-is-why-41-percent-of-white-millennials-voted-for-trump-in-2016/
[https://perma.cc/4EBQ-GWLF]; Marc Hooghe & Ruth Dassonneville, Explaining
the Trump Vote: The Effect of Racist Resentment and Anti-Immigrant Sentiments, 51
PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 528 (2018); Carlos Algara & Isaac Hale, Racial attitudes &
political cross-pressures in nationalized elections: The case of the Republican
coalition in the Trump era, 68 ELECTORAL STUD. 102207 (2020); Brian F. Schaffner,
Matthew Macwilliams, & Tatishe Nteta, Understanding White Polarization in the
2016 Vote for President: The Sobering Role of Racism and Sexism, 133 POL. SCI. Q.
9 (2018).
100. See infra notes 161–166.
101. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 163.
102. Id. at 18.
103. Ruth Igielnik & Abby Budiman, The Changing Racial and Ethnic
Composition of the U.S. Electorate, PEW RES. CTR., (Sept. 23 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/2020/09/23/the-changing-racial-and-ethniccomposition-of-the-u-s-electorate/ [https://perma.cc/TM3P-35C5].
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on racial and cultural appeals in order to turn out an ever-larger percentage of
the white vote.104
Donald Trump doubled down on the second strategy in 2016 and
2020.105 Although Trump managed an Electoral College victory in 2016, he
never managed to win the popular vote, and the Democrats increased their
popular vote majority in 2020.106 Indeed, since George H.W. Bush’s victory
in 1988, the Republican Party has won the popular vote for the Presidency
only once, in 2004.107 This is not good news for a political party that wants
to remain dominant.
Although we appear to be nearing the end of the Reagan regime, the
2020 election suggests that it is not over yet. Although Joe Biden won the
White House, Democrats lost seats in the House of Representatives.108 They
underperformed expectations in the Senate, finally achieving a 50-50 tie
following the January runoffs in Georgia.109 This means that Democrats will
have trouble achieving their most ambitious goals for reform. The January 6,
2021, insurrection at the Capitol also greatly complicated matters.110 It
showed that conspiracy theories arguing that the 2020 election was stolen –
designed to de-legitimate the incoming Biden Administration – may persist

104. Danielle Kurtzleben, Trump Defied The 2013 GOP Autopsy. So Was It A
'Failure'?, NPR, (July 16, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/07/16/891590318/trumpdefied-the-2013-gop-autopsy-so-was-it-a-failure [https://perma.cc/T467-W2AC].
105. Id.
106. National Popular Vote Tracker, COOK POLITICAL REPORT,
https://cookpolitical.com/2020-national-popular-vote-tracker
[https://perma.cc/HF8L-GA47] (last visited Feb. 14, 2021) (showing a 2.4% shift in
the popular vote from the 2016 election).
107. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 18.
108. Kelsey Snell, House Democrats Dissect What Went Wrong And How To
Rebound
From
Losses,
NPR,
(Nov.
15,
2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/11/15/934586955/house-democrats-dissect-what-wentwrong-and-how-to-rebound-from-losses [https://perma.cc/5WYU-CNSM].
109. Democrats Take Senate Control With Georgia Wins - Live Results and
Analysis, Wall Street Journal, Jan 9, 2021 at 4:27 pm ET,
https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/georgia-senate-runoff-elections-2021
[https://perma.cc/UJ5B-WV3H].
110. Ed Pilkington, Incitement: A Timeline of Trump’s Inflammatory Rhetoric
Before the Capitol Riot, GUARDIAN (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2021/jan/07/trump-incitement-inflammatory-rhetoric-capitol-riot
[https://perma.cc/TW9Z-LQZB]; Woman Dies After Shooting in U.S. Capitol; D.C.
National Guard Activated After Mob Breaches Building, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md-va/2021/01/06/dc-protests-trump-rallylive-updates/ [https://perma.cc/FEB2-EG4D]; Maggie Haberman, Trump Told Crowd
‘You Will Never Take Back Our Country with Weakness,’ N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 7, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/us/politics/trump-speech-capitol.html
[https://perma.cc/HN7L-2FFD].
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for years, and that many Republican politicians are willing to play along with
these theories for political gain.
Whether the Reagan regime is truly on its way out or manages to
reconstitute itself will have a lot to do with how the Democrats manage to deal
with the crises of the present moment: the coronavirus pandemic and the
economic contraction that accompanied it. A great deal will also turn,
however, on how the two parties handle the question of race in their evolving
coalitions.
For many years, the Republican Party has tried to win elections primarily
with white voters. As noted above, in the long run this is a losing proposition.
In the 2020 election, however, Donald Trump attracted a slightly larger
number of Black and Latino voters – particularly male voters – than he had in
2016.111 The increased share was relatively small nationwide, but it was more
significant in certain areas of the country like Florida and Texas that are
crucially important to the Republican coalition.112
Trump’s modest inroads with non-white voters probably surprised
Democrats who assumed that these voters would never vote for an overt racist
like Trump. But this neglects several factors. First, minority voters are not
monolithic. They have conflicting and cross-cutting values, which will
become ever more salient as the percentage of non-white voters in the
population grows.113 Second, many non-white voters are culturally

111. Chris Alcantara, et al., How independents, Latino voters and Catholics
shifted from 2016 and swung states for Biden and Trump, WASH. POST, (Nov. 12,
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/elections/exit-polls-changes2016-2020/ [https://perma.cc/95YA-54A6] (noting that Trump's share of the nonwhite vote improved from 21% in 2016 to 26% in 2020); Avik Roy, No, Trump Didn’t
Win ‘The Largest Share Of Non-White Voters Of Any Republican In 60 Years’,
FORBES, (Nov 9, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/theapothecary/2020/11/09/notrump-didnt-win-the-largest-share-of-non-white-voters-of-any-republican-in-60years/?sh=4863cb054a09 [https://perma.cc/GYJ3-33AM] (noting that Trump
improved from an 8% to a 12% share of the Black vote, a 29% share to a 32% share
of the Latino vote, and a 29% to a 31% share of the Asian vote).
112. Alcantara et al., supra note 113; Matt Grossman et al., Why Latinos Moved
Toward Trump (and Why Most Are Still Democrats), NISKANEN CTR, (Dec. 2, 2020),
https://www.niskanencenter.org/why-latinos-moved-toward-trump-and-why-mostare-still-democrats/ [https://perma.cc/2SGF-VCDJ]; Arelis R. Hernández & Brittney
Martin, Why Texas’s overwhelmingly Latino Rio Grande Valley turned toward Trump,
WASH. POST, (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/texas-latinorepublicans/2020/11/09/17a15422-1f92-11eb-ba21-f2f001f0554b_story.html
[https://perma.cc/S7TQ-6LVH].
113. Michael Powell, Liberals Envisioned a Multiracial Coalition. Voters of
Color
Had
Other
Ideas,
N.Y.
TIMES,
(Nov.
16,
2020),
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conservative and aspire to be prosperous members of the middle class; this
may attract them to the Republican Party. Third, Republican attacks on
Democrats as socialist may succeed with non-white voters opposed to
socialism, which they identify with authoritarian and anti-democratic
governments abroad. Fourth, some non-white voters may expect that in a
country with two white-dominated parties, both parties will either be racist or
unresponsive to demands for racial justice; if so, they may vote for whichever
party has the best chance of improving their lives economically. Fifth, nonwhite voters are not evenly distributed around the country. Republicans may
find ways to appeal to those minorities, for example in Texas and Florida, who
are most crucial to their electoral success. Sixth, and finally, in order to be
competitive nationally, Republicans do not have to win majorities of minority
voters as long as they can increase their margins slightly in particular areas of
the country, a task that both George W. Bush and Donald Trump have shown
is entirely achievable.114
Because the racial demographics of the country are evolving, and the
percentage of white voters is likely to decrease with each election cycle, the
next regime will be led by whichever party can best take advantage of these
changes in the voting population. Because of decades of Republican appeals
to white racial resentments, the Democrats have a clear head start. Their
coalition is already multiracial; they have developed, elected, and appointed a
far larger group of racial and ethnic minorities to offices and judgeships, and
Democratic politicians have made appeals to Black, Latino, and Asian voters
a priority.115 Although the future remains uncertain, Democrats still have a
good chance at forging a new political regime to succeed the Reagan
regime.116

https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/16/us/liberals-race.html [https://perma.cc/6SZMDRQF].
114. Giovanni Russonello and Patricia Mazzei, Trump’s Latino Support Was
More Widespread Than Thought, Report Finds, New York Times, April 2, 2021,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/02/us/politics/trump-latino-voters-2020.html
[https://perma.cc/7HZF-6L8G]; Roberto Suro, Richard Fry And Jeffrey S. Passel,
How Latinos Voted in 2004, Pew Research Center, June 27, 2005,
https://www.pewresearch.org/hispanic/2005/06/27/iv-how-latinos-voted-in-2004/
[https://perma.cc/8FUM-3GX3]; Julio Ricardo Varela, The Latino Vote in
Presidential Races: 1980–2012, Latino USA, October 29, 2015,

https://www.latinousa.org/2015/10/29/the-latino-vote-inpresidential-races/ [https://perma.cc/TK76-R4MV].
115. Nancy Scherer, Diversifying The Federal Bench: Is Universal Legitimacy
For The U.S. Justice System Possible?, 105 Nw. L. Rev. 587, 588-89 (2011); Sara
Atske, More minority federal judges have been appointed under Democratic than
Republican
presidents,
Pew
Research
Center,
July
19,
2016,
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/19/more-minority-federal-judgeshave-been-appointed-under-democratic-than-republican-presidents/.examples
of
non-white elected/appointed judges and politicians from Democratic party
116. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 8, 29, 64, 159.
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Nevertheless, when the loss of political power is at stake, almost all
political parties can find ways to adapt. In recent years, the Republican Party
has mostly relied on the strategies of a party that knows it is losing majority
support: stocking up on life-tenured judges, gerrymandering districts,
restricting access to the franchise, and alleging election fraud. But these
strategies for minoritarian rule will only succeed in close elections. If the
Republican Party is to remain viable as a majority party in a representative
democracy, it will have to attract an ever-larger share of racial and ethnic
minorities in the future. Doing this will require the Republican coalition to
reconstitute itself, and this, in turn, will affect the second cycle of
constitutional development – political polarization.

III. THE CYCLE OF POLARIZATION AND DEPOLARIZATION
In Part II, I described how issues of race have shaped the rise and fall of
political regimes in the United States. In this Part, I explain the role that race
played in the cycle of polarization and depolarization.
Before the Civil War, American politics became deeply polarized over
the slavery issue, but along sectional rather than strictly partisan lines.
Multiple parties went in and out of existence.117 Our modern party system
began shortly before the Civil War, when the Republicans joined the
Democrats as the country’s two major parties. These parties were defined
first by the Civil War and then by the memory of the Civil War.118 This meant
that race would remain an important dividing line in American politics.
During the late nineteenth century, the Republicans were more likely to
defend the rights of Black people (although, as noted in Part II, their interest
in protecting Black rights eventually declined), while Democrats, especially
in the South, pushed for a return of white rule and white supremacy.
Similarly, most Democrats supported Chinese exclusion policies, while the
issue split Republicans in the West and East.119
Polarization between the parties during the Gilded Age also concerned
religious identity.120 Protestant Republicans in the North were more likely to
117. Political Parties in the United States, 1820-1860,
https://www.ncpedia.org/sites/default/files/documents/nchist_political-parties1820.pdf [https://perma.cc/9KMS-MHH6].
118. CHERNY, supra note 52, at 22–23.
119. BETH LEW-WILLIAMS, THE CHINESE MUST GO: VIOLENCE, EXCLUSION,
AND THE MAKING OF THE ALIEN IN AMERICA 46–49 (2018); Jungkun Seo, Wedge-issue
dynamics and party position shifts: Chinese exclusion debates in the postReconstruction US Congress, 1879–1882, 17(6) PARTY POL. 823–47 (2010).
120. CHERNY, supra note 52, at 28–29; GIENAPP, supra note 37, at 365–67.
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be hostile to and suspicious of Catholic immigrants from Europe, most of
whom joined the Democratic Party.121 Republicans and Democrats also
squared off over issues of personal morality, especially alcohol consumption
and gambling.122 Thus, the late nineteenth century had its own version of the
culture wars, structured, as in our own day, around questions of race, religion,
immigrant status, and morality.123
Political polarization tends to cause and be caused by growing
inequalities of income and wealth. That is, polarization and income inequality
tend to egg each other on.124 As we have seen in our own age, political
fighting over cultural issues diverts politics from questions of economic
equality, makes political compromise more difficult, and hinders the passage
of redistributive legislation. A politics dominated by culture wars allows
politicians to shape the law to benefit wealthy backers, thus increasing income
inequality still further, and making the wealthy even more politically
influential. Growing income inequality, in turn, tends to intensify cultural and
racial divisions.
Just before the Civil War, income inequality in both the North and South
had increased significantly.125 But the Civil War and emancipation destroyed
a great deal of wealth. Even so, political polarization between Democrats and
Republicans remained high because of deep bitterness over the Civil War and
Reconstruction. During the Gilded Age, income inequality increased rapidly,
helping to keep polarization high, and large waves of immigration, especially
Catholic immigration, helped stoke the late nineteenth century’s version the
culture wars.
Political competitiveness, which often leads to political gridlock, also
tends to increase party polarization.126 One reason why gridlock promotes
polarization is that partisans become frustrated and increasingly desperate to
break through the political blockages in the system and push their own
agendas. A second reason that gridlock leads to polarization is that political
gridlock maintains the status quo and blocks legislation that would ameliorate
increasing income and wealth inequality.
Following the 1874 elections (when the Democrats retook the House for
the first time since the Civil War), the two parties became highly competitive,

121. CHERNY, supra note 52, at 27, 29–30.
122. Id. at 25, 28–29.
123. Id. at 29–31.
124. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 34; NOLAN MCCARTY, POLARIZATION: WHAT
EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 80-81 (2019) (noting reasons why polarization and
income inequality may cause each other).
125. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 34; Peter H. Lindert & Jeffrey G. Williamson,
American Incomes 1774– 1860 24, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No.
w18396, 2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2147106.
126. FRANCES E. LEE, INSECURE MAJORITIES: CONGRESS AND THE PERPETUAL
CAMPAIGN (2016) (arguing that political competitiveness encourages polarization and
gridlock).
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and for about two decades, American politics was essentially gridlocked.127
There were many close presidential elections, and in two cases (1876 and
1888), the popular vote winner lost to the winner of the Electoral College, a
feat that would not be repeated until our own Second Gilded Age, also a period
of highly competitive parties and intense political polarization. As a
gridlocked national government did little to deal with the mounting problems
and pervasive corruption of the Gilded Age, the culture wars raged on. Issues
of race, religion, morality, and identity dominated Gilded Age politics, and
Republicans repeatedly waved the bloody shirt and blamed Democrats for the
Civil War, labeling them the party of rebellion and immorality.128
Polarization stayed high throughout the nineteenth century until the turn
of the twentieth century, at which point politics began to depolarize rapidly.129
One reason is that that newer generations – and new political issues – replaced
older ones.130 Issues of class and economics, which were long sidelined
during the culture wars of the Gilded Age, came to the forefront. The public
tired of Gilded Age corruption, and inequalities of wealth had become so great
that pressures for reform finally broke through. Movements for progressive
reforms developed in both parties, symbolized by Theodore Roosevelt in the
Republican Party and Woodrow Wilson in the Democratic Party.131
A less innocent explanation for the political depolarization that begins
in the 1890s is that Republicans gave up on trying to protect Black civil and
political rights. Whites in the two parties moved toward an accommodation
on the issues of race that had divided them since the Civil War.132 This
accommodation meant that, after 1896, Republicans acquiesced in the South
disenfranchising its black citizens and establishing one-party rule in the
South.133
Thus, the gradual decline in political polarization between the two
parties at the turn of the twentieth century was achieved at the expense of

127. CHERNY, supra note 52, at 46–50.
128. Id. at 22–24.
129. Lewis, supra note 4.
130. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 27; see generally R. HAL WILLIAMS, REALIGNING
AMERICA: MCKINLEY, BRYAN, AND THE REMARKABLE ELECTION OF 1896
(2010)(describing new political issues and coalitions in the election of 1896).
131. See George W. Ruiz, The Ideological Convergence of Theodore Roosevelt
and Woodrow Wilson, 19 PRESIDENTIAL STUD, Q.159, 159–60 (1989).
132. SOUTHERN, supra note 48, at 35 (“By the 1890s the White North seemed to
crave reconciliation with the White South.”).
133. Id. (“The Party that initiated Reconstruction found that it no longer needed
the South and its black voters to win national elections.”)
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African Americans.134 The predictable result was acceptance or at the very
least acquiescence in vicious forms of racism and racial violence.135 The
Progressive Era witnessed the birth of the second version of the Ku Klux
Klan.136 By 1920, the Klan had millions of members, and had become a
powerful force in politics, not only in the South, but also in the Northeast and
Midwest.137 The depolarization of American politics allowed Democrats and
Republicans to cross party lines and shifted the focus of politics to issues of
economics, paving the way for the New Deal. But it occurred at the cost of
sidelining questions of racial equality for many years.
Although accommodation over race allowed both depolarization and the
creation of the New Deal coalition, persistent pressures for racial justice,
especially after World War II, began to drive cracks in the coalition, as
described previously. Following the passage of the Voting Rights Act in
1965, the Republican Party became newly competitive in the South.138 Taking
lessons from George Wallace, Republican politicians and the New Right
learned how to use wedge issues to split the New Deal coalition and gradually
reorganize American politics around issues of identity, religion, ethnicity, and
race.139 The success of these strategies led to our current political system.
Polarization grew during the 1970s and 1980s, but really took off during the
1990s.140 Barack Obama’s election in 2008 increased polarization still
further, producing partisan resentments the country had not seen since the
Civil War and the Gilded Age.141
Congressman (and later House Speaker) Newt Gingrich is a key figure
in the modern history of political polarization in the United States.142
Gingrich realized that polarization could make Republicans a majority party
that could not only win presidential elections but also gain control of
Congress.143 Gingrich and his allies developed a slash-and-burn style of
politics that became a model for conservative campaigns, labeling political

134. Id. at 34–36.
135. Id. at 94–97, 107–10.
136. Id. at 71.
137. Id. at 191.
138. VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437; Fred M.
Shelley, et al., The Civil Rights Movement and Recent Electoral Realignment in the
South, 47 SOUTHEASTERN GEOGRAPHER 13, 13–14 (2007).
139. See Goudsouzian, supra note 85 (arguing that the Republican Party's
strategy of polarization began with George Wallace's 1968 campaign and the
emergence of the New Right).
140. Lewis, supra note 4.
141. Id.
142. THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT
LOOKS: HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW
POLITICS OF EXTREMISM 31–43 (2012).
143. Id. at 33.
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opponents as immoral, sick, and un-American.144 Republican operatives built
on this strategy: they sought out wedge issues involving race, religion, and
sexuality to fracture formerly Democratic majorities, placing culture war
issues front and center.145 Another important factor was the rise of
distinctively conservative media, including talk radio, Fox News, and later
Internet sites like Breitbart. Conservative media encouraged polarization by
stoking cultural resentments and promoting the conservative movement and
the Republican Party.146
One of the consequences of the Republican strategy of polarization is
that political polarization in the Reagan regime has been asymmetrical:
Democrats have moved a little to the left, primarily because conservative
144. SAM ROSENFELD, THE POLARIZERS: POSTWAR ARCHITECTS OF OUR
PARTISAN ERA 268 (2017) (arguing that Gingrich “led the way” in developing the
GOP's “highly disciplined and confrontational political strategy that would take
partisan combat in both chambers to new heights.”); STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL
ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 146–51 (2018) (describing Gingrich’s strategy of
demonizing his political allies); MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 144, at 35– 39 (same);
McKay Coppins, The Man Who Broke Politics, THE ATLANTIC, October 17, 2018,
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/11/newt- gingrich- says- yourewelcome/570832/ [https://perma.cc/WG2Y-Y6BA] (“[F]ew figures in modern history
have done more than Gingrich to lay the groundwork for Trump’s rise. During his two
decades in Congress, he pioneered a style of partisan combat—replete with namecalling, conspiracy theories, and strategic obstructionism—that poisoned America’s
political culture and plunged Washington into permanent dysfunction.”).
145. See MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 144, at 44 (describing consequences of
Republican strategies of polarization). For a recent mea culpa by a Republican
strategist detailing the deliberate use of race and racial grievance as wedge issues. See
STEVENS, supra note 93.
146. YOCHAI BENKLER, ROBERT FARIS, & HAL ROBERTS, NETWORK
PROPAGANDA: MANIPULATION, DISINFORMATION AND RADICALIZATION IN AMERICAN
POLITICS 75–100 (2018) (arguing that conservative media have created a propaganda
feedback loop that amplifies and encourages disinformation and conspiracy theories);
Yochai Benkler, et al., Study: Breitbart-led right-wing media ecosystem altered
broader media agenda, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., (Mar. 3, 2017),
https://www.cjr.org/analysis/breitbart-media-trump-harvard-study.php
[https://perma.cc/NGN4-VA3W] (showing the emergence of a distinctive right-wing
media disinformation system); NICOLE HEMMER, MESSENGERS OF THE RIGHT:
CONSERVATIVE MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS 260–61
(2016); BRIAN ROSENWALD, TALK RADIO’S AMERICA: HOW AN INDUSTRY TOOK OVER
A POLITICAL PARTY THAT TOOK OVER THE UNITED STATES (2019); Jane Mayer, The
Making of the Fox News White House, THE NEW YORKER, (March 4, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/03/11/the-making-of-the-fox-newswhite-house [https://perma.cc/S2XM-772U] (describing how Fox News became a
propaganda arm of the Trump Administration).
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Southerners left the party, but Republicans moved considerably to the right.147
The combination of a center-left party and an increasingly hard-right party is
a characteristic feature of modern American politics. While the Democratic
Party resembles mainstream liberal parties in Europe, the Republican Party
increasingly resembles authoritarian anti-immigrant parties in Turkey and
Hungary.148

A. Racial Polarization in American Politics
Race and racial issues were always important features of the Republican
strategy of political polarization.149 They were key elements of the culture
wars that helped Republicans win the South and become the majority party in
the United States. Accordingly, Republican politicians and operatives
encouraged the organization of politics around racial resentments.150 Despite
147. MANN & ORNSTEIN, supra note 144, at 51–58 (describing asymmetric
polarization); Michael Barber & Nolan McCarty, Causes and Consequences of
Polarization, AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N, NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT IN POLITICS 19– 26
(Jane Mansbridge & Cathie Jo Martin eds., 2013) (reviewing evidence of asymmetric
polarization).
148. Sahil Chinoy, What Happened to America’s Political Center of Gravity?,
N.Y.
TIMES,
(June
26,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/26/opinion/sunday/republicanplatform-far-right.html [https://perma.cc/KA2R-NVVY] (explaining that “The
Republican Party leans much farther right than most traditional conservative parties
in Western Europe and Canada," while "The Democratic Party, in contrast, is
positioned closer to mainstream liberal parties.”); Anna Lührmann, et al., New Global
Data on Political Parties: V-Party, V-DEM INSTITUTE, BRIEFING PAPER NO. 9, 26
(Oct. 2020), https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/b6/55/b6553f85-5c5d-45ecbe63-a48a2abe3f62/briefing_paper_9.pdf [https://perma.cc/577R-NDSW] (“[T]he
Republican party in the US has retreated from upholding democratic norms in recent
years. Its rhetoric is closer to authoritarian parties, such as AKP in Turkey and Fidesz
in Hungary. Conversely, the Democratic party has retained a commitment to
longstanding democratic standards.”); The Republican Party has lurched towards
populism
and
illiberalism,
THE
ECONOMIST,
(Oct.
31,
2020),
https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2020/10/31/the-republican-party-haslurched-towards-populism-and-illiberalism [https://perma.cc/4QTN-CMTS]; Ivana
Kottasová, US Republicans are starting to look a lot like authoritarian parties in
Hungary
and
Turkey,
study
finds,
CNN,
(Oct.
26,
2020),
https://edition.cnn.com/2020/10/26/world/republican-party-more-illiberal-studyintl/index.html [https://perma.cc/39KP-9C2K].
149. THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN REACTION: THE
IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 98 (1992) (“Race was
central, Richard Nixon and key Republican strategists began to recognize, to the
fundamental conservative strategy of establishing a new, noneconomic polarization of
the electorate.”).
150. Adam M. Enders & Jamil S. Scott, White racial resentment has been
gaining political power for decades, WASH. POST: MONKEY CAGE, (Jan. 15, 2018,
11:55
AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2018/01/15/white-racial-resentment-has-been-gaining-political-power-for-
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this, for many years, both major political parties contained both racial liberals
and racial conservatives, especially among voters who do not pay much
attention to politics.151 Racial liberals are those who score lower on standard
tests for racial resentment and thus are more likely to assert that racial
inequalities are primarily due to present discrimination and the legacy of past
discrimination.152 Racial conservatives are those who score higher on
standard tests for racial resentment and thus are more likely to assert that racial
inequalities are primarily due to the fact that minorities lack individual
initiative and that whites are the more likely victims of racial discrimination
through racial preferences.153
In the 2000s, as the demographic transformation of the United States
became increasingly apparent, race and attitudes about race became especially
important factors in the country’s ever-increasing political polarization.154 As
the percentage of whites in the voting population declined, white racial
identity became increasingly self-conscious.155 The election of the nation’s
decades/ [https://perma.cc/5S5E-768L] (arguing that “racial priming” by elites has
been a key factor in the racialization of politics); see generally TALI MENDELBERG,
THE RACE CARD: CAMPAIGN STRATEGY, IMPLICIT MESSAGES, AND THE NORM OF
EQUALITY (2001) (arguing that politicians use terms like “welfare” and “crime” to
manipulate white voters’ racial resentments); DONALD R. KINDER & LYNN M.
SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS (1996)
(explaining how political elites frame issues to activate racial resentments).
151. MICHAEL TESLER, POST-RACIAL OR MOST-RACIAL: RACE AND POLITICS IN
THE OBAMA ERA 146–47 (2016); Chris Hayes & Michael Telser, Why Is This
Happening? The rise of white identity politics didn't start with Trump explains
Michael Tesler: podcast & transcript, NBC NEWS, (Oct. 30, 2018),
https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/rise-white-identity-politics-didn-t-starttrump-explains-michael-ncna926191 [https://perma.cc/V7FJ-PR97].
152. TESLER, supra note 153, at 21–22 (citing KINDER & SANDERS, supra note
152); Hayes & Telser, supra note 153.
153. TESLER, supra note 153, at 21–22 (citing KINDER & SANDERS, supra note
152); Hayes & Telser, supra note 153.
154. See TESLER, supra note 153, at 37–39 (arguing that because race is
especially salient, it has been an important driver of political polarization).
155. Richard D. Kahlenberg, The Rise of White Identity Politics, WASH.
MONTHLY, (July 2019), https://washingtonmonthly.com/magazine/july-august2019/the-rise-of-white-identity-politics/ [https://perma.cc/Q5W5-S4R3] (“White
voters increasingly see themselves as a threatened ethnic group.”); ASHLEY JARDINA,
WHITE IDENTITY POLITICS 139–40 (2019) (noting increase in white racial
consciousness and fears that whites were a becoming “a dispossessed minority”);
JOHN SIDES, ET AL., IDENTITY CRISIS: THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AND THE
BATTLE FOR THE MEANING OF AMERICA 88–89 (2018) (noting survey research
showing increasing concern by whites about discrimination against whites); ARLIE
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first Black president, Barack Obama, in 2008, made the question of racial
identity especially salient even to white voters who had not been paying very
much attention to politics.156
Despite Obama’s post-racial rhetoric and his (in hindsight, naïve)
attempts to bring an end to the nation’s political polarization, his mere
existence as a Black president helped to polarize attitudes about race among
whites.157 The 2008 campaign and Obama’s election moved increasing
numbers of racial liberals into the Democratic Party and racial conservatives
into the Republican Party.158 Thus, Obama’s presidency accelerated an
already existing trend toward the racialization of politics. Divisions on
political issues that appeared to have little to do with race – the Obama
stimulus, tax cuts, and health care – increasingly became connected to whether
white voters were racially liberal or racially conservative.159 As American
politics became increasingly racialized, political polarization increasingly
activated white racial identity.160
This set the stage for Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign and subsequent
presidency. By the 2016 election, Donald Trump was not even subtle about
using race to energize the Republican base.161 He was happy to make
obviously racist appeals,162 while brazenly insisting that he was the “least
RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, STRANGERS IN THEIR OWN LAND: ANGER AND MOURNING ON
THE AMERICAN RIGHT (2016) (noting increasing concerns by whites that non-whites
were displacing them and that whites are being discriminated against); Hayes &
Telser, supra note 153.
156. TESLER, supra note 153, at 158–64; Hayes & Telser, supra note 153.
157. TESLER, supra note 153, at 7, 158–64; Hayes & Telser, supra note 153.
158. TESLER, supra note 153, at 148–9, 163–64; Hayes & Telser, supra note
153.
159. Michael Tesler, The Spillover of Racialization into Health Care: How
President Obama Polarized Public Opinion by Racial Attitudes and Race, AMERICAN
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 56(3), 690–704 (2012); Enders & Scott, supra note
152 (“More and more, white Americans use their racial attitudes to help them decide
their positions on political questions such as whom to vote for or what stance to take
on important issues including welfare and health care.”).
160. Enders & Scott, supra note 152; Peter Baker, et al., Trump Employs an Old
Tactic: Using Race for Gain, N.Y. TIMES, (July 20, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/20/us/politics/trump-race-record.html
[https://perma.cc/F6G9-NB43].
161. German Lopez, Donald Trump’s long history of racism, from the 1970s to
2020, VOX, (Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.vox.com/2016/7/25/12270880/donaldtrump-racist-racism-history [https://perma.cc/H3EE-SJK8].
162. Baker et al., supra note 162; Lopez, supra note 163; John Cassidy, Trump’s
Overt Racism Is Uniting Democrats and Unnerving Some Republicans, THE NEW
YORKER, (July 15, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/trumpsovert-racism-is-uniting-democrats-and-unnerving-some-republicans
[https://perma.cc/DB8U-KC42]; Ibram X. Kendi, Is This the Beginning of the End of
American
Racism?,
THE
ATLANTIC,
(Sept.
2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2020/09/the-end-of-denial/614194/.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss2/6

28

Balkin: Race and the Cycles of Constitutional Time

2021]

RACE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CYCLES

471

racist person” one would ever meet;163 in the 2020 campaign he boasted that
no President had done more for African Americans, with the possible
exception of Abraham Lincoln.164 If appeals to race had previously been the
not-so-secret strategy of Republican electoral success, Donald Trump let
everyone in on the secret.165 As Thomas Esdall put it, Obama was an
involuntary lightning rod for racial polarization, but Trump was a lightning
strike, who deliberately provoked racial divisions to gain power.166 Trump
managed to make white Democrats even more racially liberal and white
Republicans even more racially conservative, heightening political
polarization in the process.

B. Depolarization and a Second Progressive Era
Is polarization a permanent feature of American politics? In Cycles, I
argue that many of the features that led to depolarization at the end of the First
Gilded Age are likely to occur again.167
Polarization seems enduring today because the culture wars have led to
a politics organized around issues of identity – race, religion, and culture – on
which compromise is difficult, if not impossible.168 The focus on these issues
– along with the strategy of polarization – has thoroughly transformed the two
163. Eugene Scott, Donald Trump: I’m ‘the least racist person’, CNN,
September
15,
2016,
(12:53
PM
EDT),

https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/15/politics/donald-trump-election-2016racism/index.html [https://perma.cc/DA45-5M72]; Eugene Scott, Six times President
Trump said he is the least racist person, WASHINGTON POST,
January
17,
2018,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2018/01/17/six-times-president-trump-said-he-is-the-least-racist-person/
[https://perma.cc/VGG3-74CQ].
164. Kendi, supra note 164; Emily Stewart, Trump says he’s the best president
for Black people since Abraham Lincoln but is not actually Lincoln, VOX, (Oct 22,
2020), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2020/10/22/21529762/trump-bidendebate-abraham-lincoln-racist [https://perma.cc/2TTR-WSL8].
165. See SIDES, ET AL., supra note 157, at 93 (“Candidates have traditionally
used implicit racial and ethnic appeals ... [to] activat[e] support among voters with less
favorable views of racial minorities. But Trump's appeals were explicit.”); Baker et
al., supra note 162 (“Mr. Trump’s presidency has been filled with so many racial
conflicts that many in Washington have become numb.”).
166. Thomas B. Edsall, The Deepening ‘Racialization’ of American Politics,
N.Y. TIMES, (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/27/opinion/trumpobama-race.html [https://perma.cc/Q9BV-5JJ2].
167. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 37, 168.
168. Id. at 167 (comparing the present situation to 1896).
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major parties from where they stood at the end of the New Deal/Civil Rights
regime. But it has also produced incoherent party coalitions, each of which
now has a populist wing and a neoliberal wing.169
The Democrats, once a labor and working-class party with a strong base
in the South, have become a cosmopolitan party, strong in the cities, the
suburbs, and along the coasts.170 The Democrats’ base of support includes
both working-class and business interests as well as minority voters.171 The
Republicans, once a party of professionals and business interests centered in
the North and the West, have been transformed into the dominant party in the
Democrats’ old stronghold – the South.172 They have traded away large
numbers of suburbanites and college-educated professionals for white
working-class and rural voters, who coexist uneasily in a party supported by
the business community and financed by a powerful base of wealthy
donors.173 By 2020, the Republican Party seemed to be united only by cultural
grievances and intense hatred of whatever liberals happen to be for.174
Political coalitions are always in motion as newer voters replace older
ones who die off. I argue in Cycles that as American voting populations
slowly evolve, the internal divisions within each party on issues of class and
economic equality will grow larger, and the internal differences within each
party will become more salient.175 These looming conflicts will begin to
unravel our current structure of party coalitions polarized around zero-sum
issues of identity, race, religion, and culture. Economic issues will
increasingly dominate.176 As this happens, politicians will find it easier to
forge alliances across party lines on particular issues, leading to further
depolarization – akin to what happened in the first several decades of the
twentieth century.177
That is my prediction, at any rate. We will not know if it will come true
for some time. It is possible that the period of depolarization during the early
twentieth century was just an anomaly that will never return. But even if
something like my prediction does happen, it raises a troubling question, if we
think about the story from the perspective of race and racial equality.
The last time depolarization happened, in the early twentieth century, it
came at the expense of African Americans. Issues of racial equality – and
169. Id. at 167–69.
170. Id. at 165–66.
171. Id. at 166–67.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Jack M. Balkin, The Reagan era never really ended. A Trump loss could
POST,
(Nov.
3,
2020),
change
that,
WASH.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/11/03/reagan-trump-politicalregimes-biden-cycles/ [https://perma.cc/L3CC-4JTR].
175. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 168–74.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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problems of racist violence – were pushed to the side so that white politicians
could make deals about the economy and government expenditures. And
when economic reforms did come during the New Deal, Southern Democrats
made sure that African Americans got fewer benefits from many of the new
programs, and they used the filibuster to prevent any progress on issues of
racial justice.178
Will the past be prologue? Will depolarization in the twenty-first
century come at the same price as depolarization in the twentieth – a political
accommodation between whites that sidelines urgent issues of racial justice?
There are reasons to think that depolarization will have different effects
this time around. By 2045, the U.S. Census predicts that racial minorities will
collectively constitute a majority of the U.S. population, and whites will be a
minority group.179 Both parties will eventually become multiracial coalitions.
The Democrats are already there; the Republicans will take longer, for reasons
I have already described. Multiracial coalitions, because they wish to preserve
cohesion, have incentives not to make issues of racial identity the central focus
of politics. In this political environment, racial minorities may find it easier
to demand economic policies and social programs that respond to their
interests.
Unlike Republicans at the end of the nineteenth century, today’s
Democrats simply cannot succeed as a national political party without voters
who are not white. It will be much harder for the Democrats of 2035 to sell
out the interests of racial minorities than it was for the Democratic Party of
1935. An important difference between the early twentieth century and the
early twenty-first is that political depolarization came after the Republican
Party had already given up on protecting Black rights. It is hard to imagine
that the Democratic Party will behave the same way anytime soon.
The story for Republican Party is a bit different. The Republican Party
has a core of voters whose racial resentments have been stoked and whose
white racial identity has been activated. As whites become a minority in the
United States, both tendencies will probably get even worse. White racial
resentments will become sharper and appeals to white identity more overt. In
the short run at least, Republicans will remain a white person’s party, and
Trumpian racial demagoguery will continue. And because the debate about
voting fraud has become racialized – especially following the 2020 election –
178. KATZNELSON, supra note 72; KATZNELSON, supra note 73.
179. William H. Frey, The US will become ‘minority white’ in 2045: Census
projects Youthful minorities are the engine of future growth, BROOKINGS: THE
AVENUE,
(Mar.
14,
2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/theavenue/2018/03/14/the-us-will-become-minority-white-in-2045-census-projects/
[https://perma.cc/UBR2-WCT7].
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Republicans will continue to attempt to limit racial minorities’ access to the
vote in order to win elections.
Even so, Republicans will not be successful as a national party without
attracting a growing number of Black, Latino, and Asian voters. That means
that the long-run problem for Republicans will be similar to that of the
Democratic coalition during the New Deal: to find positions that both its white
voters and the growing share of racial minorities it hopes to attract can agree
on. Solving this problem will lead Republicans, like Democrats, to focus on
economic questions. Cultural warfare will not go away, but it will shift to
issues on which both conservative racial minorities and conservative whites
can find common ground: moving from race and ethnicity to religion, personal
morality, and citizenship status.
In addition, the definition of who counts as “white” will probably
change, as it did during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.180 Possibly
many mixed-race people, Latinos, and Asians will be assimilated into the
social status of being white (or whatever the successor term becomes),
creating a new “white” majority.181 One should not assume, however, that
this will end racial consciousness, much less cure racial inequalities. Quite
the contrary: the danger is that as whiteness is redefined, African Americans
will continue to be excluded as the racial other.182
We should not expect that a Second Progressive Era will be any more
racially peaceful than the first one was. American politics is still constructed
around questions of identity and will be for some time to come. And as whites
come to understand themselves less as the political majority and more as a
political minority, white racial consciousness and white racial resentments
will increase. Until both of the two major party coalitions have become fully
multi-racial, we should expect that the racial politics of the next several
decades will remain divisive and fraught. The legacy of strategies of political
polarization during the Reagan regime will be with us for some time to come,
180. See generally NELL IRVIN PAINTER, THE HISTORY OF WHITE PEOPLE (2010)
(arguing that conceptions of whiteness, constantly changing through history, allowed
immigrant populations, but not African Americans, to be considered as white in the
United States); DAVID R. ROEDIGER, WORKING TOWARD WHITENESS: HOW
AMERICA'S IMMIGRANTS BECAME WHITE (2006) (arguing that the New Deal and labor
unions allowed immigrants to become part of white America).
181. For example, see Richard Alba, The Likely Persistence Of A White
Majority, AM. PROSPECT, (Jan. 11, 2016), https://prospect.org/civil-rights/likelypersistence-white-majority/ [https://perma.cc/5GL6-SRVH] (“Some people from
minority as well as mixed backgrounds are being attracted into a still heavily white
mainstream, changing the mainstream even as it continues to be dominated by
whites.”)
182. See Eric Levitz, America Will Only Remain ‘Majority White’ If Blacks
Remain
an
Underclass,
N.Y.
MAG.,
(May
3,
2018),
https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/05/for-america-to-be-white-blacks-must-bean-underclass.html [https://perma.cc/7BRA-B5Q9](“No one can be white unless
someone else is black; and America can’t retain a white majority unless it also
maintains a black minority.”).
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and the flames of racial resentment fanned in the past two decades will not
quickly die down.
At the end of the book, I point out that it is possible to imagine occasional
cooperation between the populist side of the Democratic Party and the
populist side of the Republican Party on economic questions.183 But I also
point out that this cooperation will depend on greatly on whether or not
redistributive legislation and public goods programs can be presented as
deracialized – as benefitting working-class Americans and their families
regardless of race, rather than as benefits that will flow primarily to racial
minorities and non-white immigrants.184 Associating government programs
with race was the tactic used to galvanize opposition to President Obama’s
economic stimulus bill and the Affordable Care Act.185 If political opponents
successfully racialize reforms, Republican politicians will refuse to cooperate,
and this will prevent cross-party coalitions. In that case, it will be much harder
to deal with problems of economic inequality in the United States.

IV. RACE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ROT
The third cycle described in the book involves episodes of constitutional
rot followed by periods of constitutional renewal. My discussion builds on
the history laid out in the previous two Sections.

A. Constitutional Rot
I define rot as the process by which governments become less democratic
and less republican over time.186 “Less democratic” means that government
becomes increasingly unresponsive to popular opinion and popular will.
“Less republican” refers to various elements of republican decay: loss of
public trust in institutions, loss of trust between political leaders of different
parties, the breaching of norms of cooperation between members of different
parties, the rise of demagogues who engage in propaganda and promote
conspiracy theories, and pervasive political corruption.187 Loss of republican
civic virtue means that elected representatives become increasingly less
devoted to the public good, instead focusing on pleasing or paying off a

183. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 168–74.
184. Id. at 169, 172–3.
185. TESLER, supra note 153, at 29-35; Tesler, supra note 161.
186. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 44–45.
187. Id. at 46, 49.
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relatively small set of powerful individuals and groups who keep them in
power.188
I identify four key factors in constitutional rot, which I call the Four
Horsemen of Constitutional Rot.189 The first is increasing economic
inequality. The second is political polarization. The third is loss of trust
between citizens and government, between members of different parties, and
between political leaders. The fourth factor is a series of policy disasters that
show that the government is unable or unwilling to take care of its citizens
and act in their interests. All of the four horsemen are on the march in the
United States today.
Constitutional rot also involves the gradual decay of norms of
cooperation between different parties that is necessary for multiparty
democracy to function.190 Political leaders increasingly refuse to play by the
rules of democracy and engage in various hardball tactics to stay in power,
because they no longer regard their opponents as legitimate and fear allowing
their opponents to have power. Representative democracy requires
acceptance of majority rule, and a willingness to give up power when a party
fails to win the support of a majority. When constitutional rot sets in, the
dominant party is increasingly unwilling to accept democratic rotation in
office. Instead, politicians attempt to entrench minoritarian government.
Thus, constitutional rot eventually leads to oligarchy or to authoritarianism,
even if the country still holds elections and preserves the outward forms of
representative government.191

B. Race and Constitutional Rot
In Cycles, I point to three different episodes of constitutional rot in the
nation’s history. The first is the period just before the Civil War, when the
Slave Power dominated American politics.192 Wealthy slaveholders used
their economic power and the representational boost of the three-fifths clause
to entrench their power in the federal government and to use their political
power to expand slavery into new federal territories.193 After Abraham
Lincoln’s election, Southern elites feared that they could no longer control the
federal government and that the new Republican Party could not be trusted.
They left the Union, precipitating the most important constitutional crisis in
American history, the Civil War.
188. Id. at 46.
189. Id. at 49–50.
190. Id. at 46; see also LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 146, at 102–17
(emphasizing importance of norms of cooperation and forbearance in multiparty
democracies).
191. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 50, 53; see also Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional
Crisis and Constitutional Rot, CONST. DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? 13 (Mark A. Graber,
Sanford Levinson & Mark Tushnet, eds., (2018).
192. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 45.
193. Id. at 52.
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The second episode of constitutional rot occurred during the First Gilded
Age, a period of growing economic inequality, strong polarization, demagogic
politics, and deep political corruption.194 In Cycles, I argue that a third episode
of constitutional rot is occurring today. We are living in America’s Second
Gilded Age, which has many of the same worrisome features as the First
Gilded Age.195 In addition, today’s Republican Party, increasingly filled with
radicals and authoritarians, and led by a racist demagogue, Donald Trump,
has repeatedly undermined democratic norms.196 Facing the changing
demographics of the United States, and fearful that it will be unable to win
national majorities, Republicans have tried to maintain power through a series
of strategies designed to entrench minority rule.197
Race plays an important role in each of these three episodes of rot. The
Slave Power leveraged the ownership and exploitation of Black people to
maintain control over American politics. Gilded Age politicians used race as
a means of stoking polarization and mutual hatreds between the two major
political parties.198 Polarization led to a long period of political gridlock,
during which wealth and income inequality mounted, and railroads and other
business interests leveraged their financial power to gain even greater

194. Id. at 62–64.
195. Id. at 53, 62–64.
196. See LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 146, at 145–204; Michael J. Klarman,
Foreword: The Degradation of American Democracy—and the Court, 134 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 19–66 (2020).
197. Seth Masket, It’s dangerous when the minority party rules everyone else,
WASH. POST, (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/minorityparty-electoral-college-court-trump/2020/09/25/1163b954-fdfc-11ea-8d059beaaa91c71f_story.html [https://perma.cc/4DJP-XT2Y]; Jacob T. Levy, Democracy
for
Republicans,
NISKANEN
CTR,
(Feb.
20,
2019),

https://www.niskanencenter.org/democracy-for-republicans/
[https://perma.cc/H5WE-2K49]; Vann R. Newkirk II, How the Minority Wins, THE
ATLANTIC,
(Dec.
12,
2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/12/gop-maneuvers-rule-minorityparty/577948/ [https://perma.cc/V2EJ-MELK]; Damon Linker, The GOP's minority
rule, THE WEEK, (July 20, 2018), https://theweek.com/articles/785710/gops-minorityrule [https://perma.cc/7Z7P-XFSP].
198. See CHERNY, supra note 52, at 25–29 (explaining how Democratic and
Republican parties divided over issues of race, ethnicity, and religion); Julia Azari &
Marc J. Hetherington, Back to the Future? What the Politics of the Late Nineteenth
Century Can Tell Us about the 2016 Election, 667 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL.
AND SOC. SCI. 92, 102 (2016) (noting that race was a major driver of political
polarization between North and South during the late nineteenth century).
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advantages for themselves.199 As I noted earlier, racially polarized politics is
also an important feature of today’s Second Gilded Age.200 Like the first
Gilded Age, we also live in a period of sustained government gridlock and
political corruption, in which politicians have used strategies of polarization
to deflect attention from upward redistribution of income and mounting
problems of economic inequality.201
Although racialized polarization increased throughout the Second
Gilded Age, President Donald Trump has exacerbated it by repeatedly
drumming up symbolic fights about race and engaging in racist rhetoric.202
Trump’s conspiracy theories surrounding the 2020 election played to the
racialized polarization of American politics that he had helped inflame. These
conspiracy theories have asserted that illegal votes were counted – or that
votes were stolen or altered – in urban areas with large minority
populations.203 Trump’s attack on the legitimacy of the 2020 election was a
199. CHERNY, supra note 52, at 46.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 103–18.
201. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 53; see generally JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL
PIERSON LET THEM EAT TWEETS: HOW THE RIGHT RULES IN AN AGE OF EXTREME
INEQUALITY (2020) (describing the use of strategies of political polarization to enable
upward redistribution); JACOB S. HACKER, THE GREAT RISK SHIFT: THE NEW
ECONOMIC INSECURITY AND THE DECLINE OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (rev. ed. 2008)
(describing how Republican policies have enriched business interests and wealthy
donors by shifting risks of capitalism onto the poor and middle class).
202. See Kevin Liptak & Kristen Holmes, Trump calls Black Lives Matter a
'symbol of hate' as he digs in on race, CNN, (July 1, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/07/01/politics/donald-trump-black-lives-matterconfederate-race/index.html [https://perma.cc/5YPK-KUSY] (noting Trump's
defense of Confederate monuments, his attacks on Black Lives Matter and racially
coded attacks on fair housing laws); Ashley Parker & Josh Dawsey, Trump pushes
fights over racist legacy while much of America moves in a different direction, WASH.
POST, (June 11, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-pushesfights-over-racist-legacy-while-much-of-america-moves-in-a-differentdirection/2020/06/11/8d4398a4-abf5-11ea-9063-e69bd6520940_story.html
[https://perma.cc/4E8B-4Z8B] (“President Trump has charged into a series of fights
over the nation’s racist legacy – gambling that taking divisive stances on Confederate
symbols and policing will energize his mostly white supporters in November.”).
203. Emily Badger, The Cities Central to Fraud Conspiracy Theories Didn’t
Cost
Trump
the
Election,
N.Y. TIMES,
November
16,
2020,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/16/upshot/election-fraud-trump-cities.html
[https://perma.cc/9QQ7-REL6] (“That these three cities [Philadelphia, Detroit, and
Milwaukee] would become the chief sites of Republican claims of fraud in this
election is unsurprising. All three are heavily Democratic. They have large AfricanAmerican populations. And in their respective states, they have long been targets of
racialized charges of corruption.”); Janell Ross and Janelle Griffith, How Trump's
legal battles to overturn the election undermine the Black vote, NBC NEWS, (Nov. 24,
2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/how-trump-s-legal-battles-overturnelection-undermine-black-vote-n1248866 [https://perma.cc/JAW7-AAG7]; Juana
Summers, Trump Push To Invalidate Votes In Heavily Black Cities Alarms Civil
Rights
Groups,
NPR,
(Nov.
24,
2020),
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continuation of his attacks on the legitimacy of minorities exercising political
power – the most famous being his claim that Barack Obama was not
legitimately president because he was not born in the United States.204
Trump’s attacks on racial minorities and on minority political power
resonated with racially conservative whites who feared that they were slowly
losing political dominance in the United States.205 It was hardly surprising,
then, that many of the insurrectionists in the January 6, 2021 attack on the
Capitol were members of white supremacist and white nationalist groups.206

C. Constitutional Rot as a Relative Term
Cycles does not argue that other periods in American history lack
elements of constitutional rot.207 American democracy has never been fully
democratic and never fully republican. Subordinating racial groups violates
both principles of democracy and republicanism, and American history is full
of racial subordination and denials of access to the political process.
https://www.npr.org/2020/11/24/938187233/trump-push-to-invalidate-votes-inheavily-black-cities-alarms-civil-rights-group [https://perma.cc/KH57-NJ82].
204. BARACK OBAMA, A PROMISED LAND 737 (2020) (arguing that “[f]or
millions of Americans spooked by a Black man in the White House, [Trump] promised
an elixir for their racial anxiety” by “peddling assertions that I had not been born in
the United States and was thus an illegitimate president.”); Michael Barbaro, Donald
Trump Clung to ‘Birther’ Lie for Years, and Still Isn’t Apologetic, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept.
16, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/us/politics/donald-trump-obamabirther.html [https://perma.cc/PTB9-FSKZ].
205. Thomas B. Edsall, White Riot, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 13, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/13/opinion/capitol-riot-white-grievance.html
[https://perma.cc/N9LB-HTB7].
206. Edsall, supra note 206; John Blake, The Capitol insurrection could be a
bigger racial reckoning than the George Floyd protests, CNN, (Jan. 17, 2021),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/17/us/capitol-riot-racial-justice-blake/index.html
[https://perma.cc/L392-X2CB]; Sabrina Tavernise and Matthew Rosenberg, These
Are the Rioters Who Stormed the Nation’s Capitol, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 12, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/07/us/names-of-rioters-capitol.html
[https://perma.cc/8BAX-R5R4]; Kristin Romey, Decoding the hate symbols seen at
the Capitol insurrection, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC, (Jan. 12, 2021),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/2021/01/decoding-hate-symbols-seenat-capitol-insurrection/ [https://perma.cc/Q8AX-2BNN]; Mallory Simon and Sara
Sidner, Decoding the extremist symbols and groups at the Capitol Hill insurrection,
CNN, (Jan. 11, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/01/09/us/capitol-hill-insurrectionextremist-flags-soh/index.html [https://perma.cc/WWE9-HPGJ].
207. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 45.
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The country began with slavery and limited rights to vote. Even after
slavery was abolished in 1865, racial and economic inequalities continued,
and got worse over time: Jim Crow and black disenfranchisement began at the
turn of the twentieth century and continued for decades.208 Women did not
obtain the right to vote nationwide until 1920. Our modern conception of civil
rights and civil liberties is barely a half century old, has always been
imperfectly enforced, and has been repeatedly undermined by episodes of
political retrenchment. The redemption of American democracy remains an
unfinished project.209
The idea of constitutional rot, in other words is a relative conception.210
It describes a period of backsliding from a period of relative improvement in
democracy and republicanism that may have been unjust and imperfect in
many respects.
A similar point applies to periods of constitutional renewal.
Constitutional renewal does not mean that all aspects of the constitutional
system improve. The constitutional system can get better in some respects
and worse in others. During the early Jacksonian period, for example, the
right to vote expanded to include most white males. But increasing
democratization was accompanied by the exclusion of women, the expansion
of slavery, and the forced relocation of Native Americans.211 In terms of
democracy and republicanism, the Jacksonian era is simultaneously a period
of progress and regress.
Another example is the Progressive Era, which the book identifies as a
period of constitutional renewal following the First Gilded Age. During the
first two decades of the twentieth century, progressives pushed for reforms in
multiple areas, promoting greater democracy, securing women’s right to vote,
opposing political corruption, breaking up monopolies, helping the
downtrodden, and promoting greater economic equality.212 But race was the
Progressive Era’s major blind spot.213 Some progressive reformers ignored
racial inequalities while others, like Woodrow Wilson, actively made things
worse.214 Educated elites embraced scientific theories of racism.215 Even as
progressives sought to reform politics, Southern states became one-party
regimes that disenfranchised Blacks and poor whites and brutally put down
resistance. Racist demagogues like Ben Tillman dominated southern politics,
defending violence against Black people and refusing to accept majority
government if it included rule by Black voters.216 The Progressive Era, for all
208. See SOUTHERN, supra note 48, at 24–33, 38, 72–109.
209. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 45.
210. Id.
211. LEONARD & CORNELL, supra note 33, at 147, 175-77, 207-209, 220.
212. SOUTHERN, supra note 48, at 1, 44–45.
213. Id. at 2–3.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 47–56.
216. Id. at 88–91, 97–102.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss2/6

38

Balkin: Race and the Cycles of Constitutional Time

2021]

RACE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CYCLES

481

its achievements, was also a regressive era, especially when we focus on
race.217 It was both an era of constitutional renewal and a continuation of
constitutional rot.
The lesson of the Jacksonian and Progressive eras is that when
democratic renewal primarily concerns the expansion of democracy for
whites, it often comes at the expense of racial minorities. Conversely, periods
of democratic renewal for African Americans, such as Reconstruction and the
Civil Rights era, are often bitterly resisted by conservative whites who want
to maintain the elevated status of being white. The result in both cases has
been that attempts at multi-racial democracy have been succeeded by periods
of racial retrenchment, racialized political polarization, increasing economic
inequality, and political corruption.
It is hardly accidental that constitutional rot is connected to attempts to
maintain racial hierarchy.218 Throughout American history politicians have
tried to gain and maintain political power by deliberately polarizing politics,
using race as a central tool of political polarization. Whether or not these
attempts have been successful in the short run, the long-term result has been
constitutional rot.

V. CONCLUSION
The Cycles of Constitutional Time ends with a warning that
constitutional rot is a stubborn condition, and that eradicating it will take many
years of political effort.219 Nevertheless, because the Reagan regime is
nearing its conclusion, and because political coalitions are continually
changing, Americans have a chance to alter the basic assumptions of

217. Id. at 47.
218. There is a deep tension between the maintenance of racial hierarchies, on
the one hand, and democracy and republicanism on the other. The logic of democracy
pushes toward broad participation in governance and general equality among the
members of the political community. The republican conception of liberty is nondomination rather than merely formal freedom from restraint. See PHILIP PETTIT,
REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 6, 12, 21, 31–32 (1997)
(arguing that the distinctively republican conception of freedom is nondomination). In
republican thought, the opposite of liberty is slavery—subjection to the arbitrary will
of another—which can take many different forms, and is not limited to chattel slavery.
Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Dangerous Thirteenth Amendment, 112
COLUMBIA. L. REV. 1459, 1481–86, 1496 (2012). The American colonists, for
example, thought of themselves as political slaves because they were not represented
in Parliament. Id. at 1481–85.
219. BALKIN, supra note 1, at 173–74.
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American politics and renew their democracy in the next few decades.220
Whether Americans will succeed, of course, cannot be known at present.
Things may even get worse before they get better. All we have is possibility
and hope, not certainty.
Much will turn on how the two major political parties accept and
accommodate themselves to the changing racial demographics of the United
States. To the extent that the parties become genuine multiracial coalitions,
they will have incentives to deemphasize the racially polarized politics of the
past forty years, and fight about economic issues that can appeal across the
different parts of their coalition. Just as President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
Democrats attracted Black voters because the latter saw that New Deal
policies benefited them economically, both parties might find new ways both
to attract and appeal to African Americans, Latinos, and Asians, who will
collectively constitute the majority of voters by the middle of the twenty-first
century.
The Democrats are already well on the road to this reformation. Because
of the politics of the Reagan regime, and especially the Trump presidency, the
Republican Party faces a greater challenge. At present it seems backed into a
corner as a white person’s party devoted to stirring up cultural and racial
resentments to an ever-greater pitch to mobilize its shrinking base of white
voters. But, as noted above, the situation is actually more complicated:
Republicans have powerful incentives to increase their share of non-white
voters, and the party’s coalition continues to evolve.
In this Article, I have argued that race and the politics of race have been
important drivers of the cycles of constitutional time. That is likely to
continue for the foreseeable future, but with one important difference. Up
until now, the use of race in American politics has always operated under a
particular set of assumptions: that whites are and will continue to be, the
overwhelming majority of the country’s voters, and that all other groups are,
and will continue to be, political if not numerical minorities. For most of its
history, American politics has been a struggle for political power between
different groups of whites, with non-whites either excluded or relegated to the
margins of political power. In the years to come, we will discover what will
happen to the cycles of constitutional time when this assumption changes.

220. Id.
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